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Editor: D. BarceloMultisectoral partnerships are increasingly cited as a mechanism to deliver and improve disaster risk manage-
ment. Yet, partnerships are not a panacea and more research is required to understand the role that they can
play in disaster risk management and particularly disaster risk reduction. This paper investigates how partner-
ships can incentivise ﬂood risk reduction by focusing on the UK public-private partnership on ﬂood insurance.
Developing the right ﬂood insurance arrangements to incentivise ﬂood risk reduction and adaptation to climate
change is a key challenge. In the face of rising ﬂood risks due to climate change and socio-economic development
insurance partnerships can no longer afford to focus only on the risk transfer function. However, while expecta-
tions of the insurance industry have traditionally been high when it comes to ﬂood risk management, the insur-
ance industry alonewill not provide the solution to the challenge of rising risks. The case of ﬂood insurance in the
UK illustrates this: even national government and industry together cannot fully address these risks and other
actors need to be involved to create strong incentives for risk reduction. Using an agent-based model focused
on surfacewater ﬂood risk in Londonwe analyse how other partners could strengthen the insurance partnership
by reducing ﬂood risk and thus helping tomaintain affordable insurance premiums. Our ﬁndings are relevant for
wider discussions on the potential of insurance schemes to incentivise ﬂood riskmanagement and climate adap-
tation in the UK and also internationally.
© 2018 Published by Elsevier B.V.Keywords:
Partnerships
Insurance
Climate change
Surface water ﬂood risknkins@eci.ox.ac.uk, (K. Jenkins),1. Introduction
The risk of climate-related disasters and associated economic losses
has been increasing globally in the last few decades andwill continue to
193F. Crick et al. / Science of the Total Environment 636 (2018) 192–204do so as a result of climate change and socio-economic development
(IPCC, 2012). Tomanage these risks and improve society's ability to pre-
pare for, respond to and recover from disasters, there have been grow-
ing calls for greater collaboration and partnerships between the public,
private and civil society sectors. These multisectoral partnerships
(MSPs) are increasingly seen as critical for the delivery of sustainable
development goals and improved disaster risk management (UNISDR
(2011) and UN (2015)).
Despite the growing calls for partnerships, there has been little re-
search examining how effectively they can help reduce the risk from di-
sasters, the roles of public, private and civil society actors, and how they
can act together. A critical issue is how to bring together those actors
that can really bring about change. Furthermore, partnerships for disas-
ter risk management are usually not static andmay evolve over time, as
they will be affected by a range of factors, including population growth,
development trends and changing climate risks. This can have implica-
tions for themembership as newor different partnersmay be needed to
fulﬁl the aims of a partnership.
In this paper, we investigate the role that partnerships can play in
incentivising ﬂood risk reduction by focusing on the arrangements be-
tween the UK government and the insurance industry. The ﬂood insur-
ance partnership between the Association of British Insurers (ABI) and
the UK government was ﬁrst established in 2000. It was modiﬁed into
a new partnership in 2016 with the creation of Flood Re (outlined
below), presented by industry and government as an innovative way
of securing future affordability and availability of ﬂood insurance. Yet,
there are concerns about its ability to achieve its aim of providing a tran-
sition to a market with risk reﬂective pricing where insurance remains
affordable and widely available (Hjalmarsson and Davey, 2016), espe-
cially because in its current set-up it does not provide any direct
means to encourage risk reducing behaviour. Recognising its lack of po-
tential to directly inﬂuence risk reduction, Flood Re identiﬁes the need
to build strong partnerships with a range of actors from the public, pri-
vate and civil society sectors as a key strategy to ensure a successful
transition phase (Flood Re, 2016).
This paper investigates this by focusing on partnerships with local
government and property developers, and for one particular ﬂood risk
category, surface water (SW). This is the least understood of the
ﬂooding risks and represents one of the biggest potential impacts of cli-
mate change on the UK (Defra, 2012). SW ﬂood risk management has
been assessed by the UK's Committee on Climate Change as a key adap-
tation priority where insufﬁcient progress has been made in managing
vulnerability and providing a plan of action (Committee on Climate
Change, 2015). An agent-based model (ABM), designed to simulate
the dynamics of SW ﬂooding, changing levels of risk and choices made
by different partners (see Dubbelboer et al., 2017 for a detailed explana-
tion of the technical aspects of model development and design) is used
to explore how the ﬂood insurance partnership could be strengthened.
In particular, we investigate how the inclusion of other partners could
enhance the risk reduction potential of insurance, testing this for the
new Flood Re scheme; examine whether there may be trade-offs be-
tween the goals of maintaining affordable insurance premiums and re-
ducing SW ﬂood risk; and highlight complexities in identifying themost
appropriate balance in the role of different partners to incentivise SW
ﬂood risk reduction.
2. The role of insurance partnerships in disaster risk reduction
In general terms, partnerships can be deﬁned as “collaborative ar-
rangements in which actors from two or more spheres of society
(state, market and civil society) are involved in a non-hierarchical pro-
cess, and through which these actors strive for a sustainability goal”
(Van Huijstee et al., 2007, 77). Within the context of natural disasters,
the overall shared goal for partnerships would be a reduction of risks
and an increase in resilience. Nevertheless, having shared goals does
not ensure the smooth running of a partnership, as partners may notattach the same importance to these goals. Indeed, while an insurance
company may want to reduce risks, it is ultimately driven by proﬁts
and accountability to shareholders. Maintaining shared goals and prior-
ities between partners over time, and reconciling diverging interests
and expectations to limit potential conﬂicts are critical challenges
(Armistead et al., 2007; Chen et al., 2013; Surminski and Leck, 2016).
Flood insurance partnerships have the primary aim of providing ﬁ-
nancial risk transfer for ﬂood risk, for example in the absence of a func-
tioning market. However, there are indications that these partnerships
could also help to achieve a move away from a narrow ﬁnancial risk
transfer focus towards a more holistic and joint-up ﬂood risk manage-
ment strategy (European Commission (2013)).
In thewake of recent natural disasters there has been growing inter-
est from policy makers, practitioners and academics in the use of insur-
ance as an economic disaster risk management tool to encourage
prevention efforts and reduce physical ﬂood risk (Crichton, 2008;
Surminski, 2014; Surminski et al., 2015). This is based on the under-
standing that purchasing an insurance product can inﬂuence the behav-
iour of those at risk. This can be in a moral hazard context where
insurance can lead to more risky behaviour. For example, individuals'
motives and behaviour to prevent loss may be reduced if ﬁnancially
protected through a policy; or the existence of an insurance scheme
may reduce a government's urgency to prevent and reduce risks. Alter-
natively, purchasing an insuranceproduct can act as an incentive, where
insurance can trigger risk reduction investments or the implementation
of prevention measures (Kunreuther and Michel-Kerjan, 2009;
Kunreuther, 1996).
There is wide agreement that insurance can encourage risk reduc-
tion by attaching a price tag to risk and by sending signals to agents
such as policy holders, governments or insurers themselves,
incentivising or even forcing them to address the underlying risk (e.g.
Kunreuther, 1996, Botzen and van den Bergh, 2009, Botzen and van
den Bergh, 2009, Treby et al., 2006). Indeed, there are many ﬂood risk
management options that ﬂood insurance could incentivise, including
ﬂood prooﬁng of buildings and property, retroﬁtting of houses, local
ﬂood protection measures, and building larger scale ﬂood protection
schemes (Bräuninger et al., 2011).
However, evidence highlights that this incentive role is
underutilized (Botzen et al., 2009; Lamond et al., 2009; Surminski,
2014; Surminski and Hudson, 2016). A range of barriers exist, including
the absence of adequate risk-based pricing,mismatch between required
prevention investment by policy holders and the premium savings; the
short-term nature of insurance contracts; as well as a prevailing uncer-
tainty about the beneﬁts of risk reduction measures (Ball et al., 2013;
Bräuninger et al., 2011). In response, there is growing focus on partner-
ships as a way to address at least some of these barriers. The European
Insurance industry, for example, views partnerships as vital for reasons
of insurability, risk transfer and ensuring the use of appropriate adapta-
tion and prevention measures (CEA, 2007).
2.1. The evolving UK ﬂood insurance partnership
The UK ﬂood insurance partnership between the UK government
and the ABI was set up in 2000 as the “Gentleman's Agreement” in the
wake of growing ﬂood losses. From 2005 it became known as the State-
ment of Principles (SoP). It sets out commitments from the insurance
industry to provide ﬂood insurance, and from government to support
ﬂood risk management and improve the quality of public ﬂood risk
data. In 2008, this agreement was extended for a ﬁnal ﬁve-year period
until 2013 and committed the government and insurance industry to
a transition to a free market for ﬂood insurance (Penning-Rowsell
et al., 2014).
However, from 2010 onwards, sparked by concern about rising risk
costs and the increasing frequency of high loss events, the insurance in-
dustry and government took steps to reach an understanding on how to
replace the SoP. After a public consultation the government selected
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port the private insurance industry and promote the affordability of
ﬂood insurance. After receiving state aid approval and securing an ex-
emption statement from the Secretary of State, justifying the policy in-
tervention despite not meeting cost-beneﬁt targets, Flood Re gained
parliamentary approval in 2014 (Surminski and Eldridge, 2017) and
started operations in April 2016.
The scheme works by giving insurers the option of reinsuring poli-
cies with Flood Re at a highly-discounted price. The subsidy is collected
as a levy from insurers, who may pass on the levy to policyholders (es-
timated to be £10.50 per policy (Aviva, 2016)). The discounted price for
a policy is calculated based on the council tax banding of the insured
property; the more afﬂuent the council tax banding, the higher the
price. As insurers can pass on their risk for a reduced price, they can
charge lower premiums to high risk policyholders (Flood Re, 2016).
Homes are eligible for Flood Re regardless of their ﬂood risk. However,
properties build after 2009 are excluded, as are small and medium-
sized enterprises (Defra, 2013). Fig. 1 outlines the mechanics of Flood
Re and the relationship between government and industry.
In the long-term, Flood Re’s key objective is to provide a smooth
transition to a free market that applies risk reﬂective pricing. However,
to achieve this a combination of amending premium thresholds and re-
ducing ﬂood risk will be necessary to keep ﬂood insurance affordable
(Flood Re, 2016). Yet, there are already concerns that the new pool
does not sufﬁciently consider rising ﬂood risks due to climate change
nor incentivise ﬂood risk reduction or the improvement of the ﬂood re-
silience of properties (Surminski and Eldridge, 2017; Hjalmarsson and
Davey, 2016; Jenkins et al., 2017a). Indeed, the UK Committee on Cli-
mate Change ﬁnd that in its current design Flood Re is likely to be
counter-productive to the long-term management of ﬂood risk as it
does not provide enough incentives for high-risk households to put
measures in place to avoid or reduce ﬂood damage (Committee on
Climate Change, 2015). Furthermore, a recent study by Jenkins et al.
(2017a) shows that Flood Re is likely to lead to an increasing gap be-
tween subsidized premiums and risk-based prices that consumers
would face outside Flood Re.
Ultimately, such studies highlight that ﬂood insurance cannot be
kept affordable without a concerted effort to address the underlyingFig. 1. The new insurance pfactors which drive ﬂood risk in the ﬁrst place. This requires involve-
ment from a broad suite of stakeholders, including but not limited to
the government, the insurance industry, property owners and property
developers. Many of these stakeholders are indirectly beneﬁting from
insurance but are not formally involved in the partnership.
2.2. Strengthening the insurance partnership by involving more actors?
While expectations of the insurance industry have traditionally been
high when it comes to ﬂood risk management (e.g. Kunreuther, 1996;
Botzen and van den Bergh, 2009; European Environment Agency,
2013), the insurance industry alone cannot provide the solution. A
wide range of private and public stakeholders have a critical role to
play in incorporating ﬂood risk reduction considerations into urban de-
velopments. This ranges from the ﬁrst stage of designing the develop-
ment through to the ﬁnal construction: developers, local government
planning ofﬁcers, architects, ﬂood risk consultants, surveyors, the Envi-
ronment Agency, water companies, building contractors and mortgage
providers (Bosher et al., 2009; Bosher, 2012; Surminski, 2014). Yet,
many of these actors have not been actively involved in the manage-
ment of ﬂood risk, and in particular SW ﬂood risk. Indeed, there is a
lack of clarity around how to engage these different actors for SW
ﬂood risk reduction and what actions they could take independently
or in collaboration with the government.
For this study we limit our investigation to property developers and
local government, and explore their possible interactions with the in-
surance system. Both actors are of particular interest due to their role
in the pre-construction phase of a development, which according to
Bosher et al. (2009) is themost important stagewhere key stakeholders
can proactively adopt ﬂood risk reduction and prevention measures.
In England, local governments have lead responsibility for managing
local ﬂood risk, including SW runoff, are the approving body for sustain-
able drainage systems (SUDS), and approve local developments as well
as investing in ﬂood defences. Likewise, developing in a ﬂood-resilient
way and in the correct location can minimise current and future risks
to both the development itself and the surrounding area. In the UK,
planning guidelines have been tightened under the National Planning
Policy Framework (DCLG, 2012) with subsequent amendments inartnership – Flood Re.
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(DCLG, 2014). However, the economic beneﬁts of developments and
demand for housing provide a case for developers to continue to build
on high ﬂood risk land, and for local authorities to approve such devel-
opments. Yet, the role of property developers in reducing ﬂood risk has
to date received little attention with the exception of a few case studies
(e.g. Taylor et al., 2012; Taylor and Harman, 2016; Handmer, 2008). In-
terestingly for our investigation is that the burden of ﬂood risk does not
remain with developers but rests with home-owners, who then use
ﬂood insurance to transfer this risk, either voluntarily or as required
through their mortgage provider.
Currently, Flood Re is not available for properties built after 2009.
This is in line with earlier practices, when insurers in 2008 decided
that new buildings would no longer require the ﬂood insurance guaran-
tee given through the SoP based on the assumption that a strengthened
planning system, as well as increased awareness of developers, should
deliver and prevent new high risk properties from being built
(Alexander et al., 2016). At that time the ABI also issued guidance to as-
sist developerswith building ﬂood resilient properties through practical
steps such as raising ﬂoor levels of properties (ABI, 2009). However, it is
unclear how successful these measures were, as there is evidence that
costs of risks are becoming less of a concern, overridden by the growing
concern about lack of housing, which has led to an easing of planning
rules (Committee on Climate Change, 2015). Overall the effectiveness
of the planning system remains a cause of debate, with around 12% of
all new residential development in England between 2001 and 2014
taking place in ﬂoodplains, and around 25% of that ﬂoodplain develop-
ment occurring in areas at medium or high levels of ﬂood risk (ibid.).3. An agent based model to investigate the UK ﬂood insurance
partnership
An agent-based approach considers the simple and complex phe-
nomena that may result from interactions between different agents in
a shared environment. ABMs provide a bottom-up approach for under-
standing such dynamic interactions in complex systems, and can pro-
vide an improved understanding of systems by simulating these
systems and their evolution (Bandini et al., 2009). In addition, by
adjusting certain model parameters ABMs can be used to investigate
key drivers, scope, and limits for future evolution of these systems,
and visualise possible strategies and evolutionary pathways. As such
they have a number of advantages as support tools for policy making,
including their accessibility and ﬂexibility for testing different condi-
tions and behavioural rules (van Dam et al., 2012).
Despite a growing interest in ABMs across different ﬁelds there is
limited application of this method to ﬂood risk management. Examples
include Haer et al. (2016) who use an ABM to explore the effectiveness
of ﬂood risk communication and inﬂuence of social networks in the
Netherlands, and Dawson et al. (2011) who use the method to investi-
gate ﬂood incident management related to storm surge in the UK. As
highlighted by Dubbelboer et al. (2017), ABMs have had limited appli-
cation in the insurance sector to date, with no direct focus on SW
ﬂood risk management or the role of insurance in addressing rising
risks.
In this paper, we use a novel ABM developed for London (ibid.), and
applied here to the London Borough of Camden which is considered to
be at high risk of SW ﬂooding (Drain London, 2011). The ABM has
been parameterised based on a large array of data sources and devel-
oped around GIS data. A key data input to the ABM is a probabilistic
SW ﬂood event set (Jenkins et al., 2017b) that provides a set of synthetic
ﬂood events with spatially heterogeneous return periods and estimated
household ﬂood damages. A probability-damage curve is estimated an-
nually for every house in the model based on this data, and SW ﬂood
risk calculated as the area under the curve (see Dubbelboer et al.
(2017) or Appendix A for further details).To represent the role that the partnership could play in incentivising
SW ﬂood risk reduction the ABM includes three main agents: i) local
government, which has a key role in managing local ﬂood risk and ap-
proving new developments; ii) an insurer, which is committed to the
provision of ﬂood risk insurance and the running of Flood Re; and iii)
a private property developer building new properties in the local area.
In addition, the ABM represents i) people who can own, buy and sell
houses in the model and require ﬂood risk insurance; ii) a bank agent
that can repossess properties if homeowners default on mortgage pay-
ments; and iii) the housing market.
Fig. 2 provides an overview of the ABMwith its key processes and in-
teractions, and Table 1 provides a summary of the main agent behav-
iours which underlie the model. Further details of the underlying SW
ﬂood event set, estimation of SW ﬂood risk, and the behaviour and pro-
cedure of each agent is available in Appendix A and Dubbelboer et al.
(2017).
Using the ABMwe investigate the impact that different hypothetical
public policy measures (Table 2) could have on reducing SW ﬂood risk;
maintaining the affordability of insurance; and whether trade-offs or
counter-active effects occur on SW ﬂood risk reduction and insurance
affordability when constraints on both sets of actors are combined.
Each experiment setting was run using the set of synthetic ﬂood
events with their associated residential building ﬂood damage, for a
baseline (1961–1990) and future high emission climate change scenario
for the 2030s (2030H) and 2050s (2050H) (comparable to Representa-
tive Concentration Pathways 4.5 and 8.5 respectively). The experiments
were run at a yearly time-step for 100 simulations of the 30-year time
series data corresponding to the baseline, 2030s and 2050s. These re-
peated simulations are each driven by a new resampling of the uncer-
tainties in the climate scenarios, so the statistical results reﬂect these
uncertainties as well as representation of the variability of behaviours
in the ABM. While Flood Re is intended to be a transitional scheme to
be phased out over a 25-year period, in the interests of simplicity we
have tested a steady state version of Flood Re over a 30-year simulation
period. For simplicity, the line graphs presented below represent results
averaged across each of the 300 model repetitions.
4. Results: strengthening the partnership
4.1. Role of property developers
The ABM highlights that SW ﬂood risk increases from the baseline
when no developer restrictions are in place (experiment 1) (Fig. 3a),
and is reduced when the developer is required to build all properties
with SUDS (experiment 2) or where this is imposed in combination
with other restrictions (experiment 3). This reﬂects the assumption
that SUDS will homogenously reduce ﬂood damage for properties
protected by a set percentage in the model, regardless of the location
or scale of ﬂooding. Given the limited availability ofmore detailed quan-
titative data on the beneﬁts of SUDS for ﬂood damage reduction the
value used in the ABM was assumed to be 35% (Defra, 2011), and as
suchwill lower but not totally remove SW ﬂood risk for protected prop-
erties. Whilst this reﬂects a simpliﬁed assumption to represent the role
of SUDS, sensitivity analysis highlighted that the model outputs were
not overly sensitive to the parameters related to the implementation
and beneﬁts of SUDS and Property Level Protection Measures
(PLPMs). Similar trends were seen for the 2030H and 2050H climate
scenarios, albeit at a higher level of ﬂood risk (Appendix B, Fig. B1).
The greatest reductions in average household ﬂood insurance pre-
miums occur under experiment 3 (Fig. 3b). Average ﬂood insurance
premiums begin to increase slightly from the baseline from around
year 15 under experiment 1, where there are no developer restrictions,
as these new builds are excluded from the Flood Re scheme. When de-
velopment is not regulated and does not follow the local boroughs pro-
posed housing trajectory around 5000 more homes are built by year 30
in the model, with a higher number of properties built in ﬂood risk.
Fig. 2. An overview of the key processes and interactions in the agent based model for Greater London. The agents in the model are underlined.
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under the climate change scenarios (Appendix B, Fig. B1). However,
there is greater divergence in the results between experiments 1–3,
and greater impacts on average premiums of the different experiments.
The model also allows us to examine the effects of hypothetical in-
creased investment in ﬂood defences by the developer. Under experi-
ments 2 and 3 (which both require all new developments to have
SUDS installed) a larger proportion of homes are protected from SWTable 1
Summary table of main agent behaviours.
Agent Main behaviours
Homeowner Decide to buy or sell properties
Required to renew ﬂood insurance annually
Pay household fees
Decide whether to invest in PLPMs (assumed that 1% of
homeowners invest proactively per year, while 34% invest
reactively following a ﬂood)
May consider ﬂood risk when considering to purchase a new
property
Insurer Estimates household SW ﬂood risk for every property in model (it
is assumed that where in place they account for PLPMs and SUDs
in these estimates)
Sets insurance premiums and excess levels for every property in
model
Provides all households with ﬂood insurance
Decide whether it is cost effective to place high risk properties
into Flood Re
Provide compensation, minus the excess, to properties following a
ﬂood event
Local
government
Invest up to 80% of their local ﬂood defence budget (or more in the
year of a ﬂood event) in SUDS projects which protect houses at
highest risk of ﬂooding and provide a cost-beneﬁt ratio of ≥1:5
Invest ˃20% of their local ﬂood defence budget through £5000
grants to households investing in PLPMs
Evaluate and approve/reject property development plans based
on their ﬁnancial beneﬁts and ﬂood risk
Sell land to developers for approved property developments
Developer If demand for new properties outstrips available properties on the
market propose to build new properties to meet demand
Identify optimal land to maximise proﬁts from developments,
within allocated development areas and the local governments
planned development trajectory
Submit development proposal to be approved by the local
government
Build new houses (initially assumed that 50% of all houses built
will have SUDS) and sell on the market
Bank Reposes houses if the owners are unable to afford household fees
for three consecutive years
Sell houses on marketﬂooding by SUDS over the 30-year period (Fig. 4). These results underlie
the trends highlighted in Fig. 3.
4.2. Role of local government - investing in ﬂood protection measures
(PLPMs and SUDS) and approving new developments
Secondly, the ABM is used to examine the impact that local govern-
ment investment in ﬂood protection measures would have on the af-
fordability of insurance and SW ﬂood risk reduction. Fig. 5 presents
the effect of local government investment in PLPMs and SUDSon the av-
erage SW ﬂood risk and levels of premiums of both existing houses and
new developments. While the average SW ﬂood risk of existing and
newbuild properties are similar, the beneﬁts of government investment
in ﬂood protection measures are larger for the new build houses, as
these include properties in some of the higher ﬂood risk areas, which
are targeted for SUDS projects based on their favourable cost-beneﬁt
ratio. In contrast, for existing houses in the model, the beneﬁts are
smaller and increase gradually as households mainly invest in govern-
ment funded PLPMs in a reactive way after ﬂoods. Fig. 5b highlights
the positive impact that ﬂood protection measures can have for
homeowners as the government reduces risk in the area, the insurer's
risk portfolio is reduced, and consequently households beneﬁt from
lower premiums. In contrast, premiums remain much higher for new
build houses excluded from Flood Re.
When looking at the role of the local government (experiments 4–8)
in approving new developments, and consequences for ﬂood risk and
insurance premiums, the analysis highlights that the average SW ﬂood
risk of new builds does decline by around 8% by year 30 under experi-
ment 4 where the level of proﬁt to ﬂood risk required if a development
is to be approved is increased (Fig. 6).More substantial beneﬁts in terms
of SW ﬂood risk reduction are seen under experiment 5 (halving the av-
erage SW ﬂood risk of new buildings from the baseline by year 30). This
assumes that the level of proﬁt to ﬂood risk required if a development is
to be approved is increased in combination with the government also
setting a lower maximum ﬂood risk threshold and fully assessing all
proposals based on ﬂood risk and proﬁtability.
4.3. Placing joint restrictions on property developer and local government –
evidence of trade-offs
Fig. 6 also shows results for experiments 6–8 which assess a combi-
nation of restrictions placed on both the property developer and local
government. Similar results to experiment 5 are seen under experiment
7, where some ﬁnancial conditions and restrictions on new develop-
ments are placed on the developer in parallel. A more favourable result
Table 2
Sub-set of experiments developed to test the role of the developer and local government in strengthening the insurance partnership.
Experiment
number
Developer
contributes 10% to
government Flood
Defence
Investment
Developer pays
ﬂood risk
insurance for ﬁrst
5 years of new
propertya
Developer must
build all new
properties with
SUDS in place
Limited
number of
houses
developer
can buildb
No Developer
Restrictions – (i.e.
no government
approval needed to
build)
Local
Government
sets a more
stringent
development
approval ratioc
Local
Government
sets
lower maximum
acceptable ﬂood
risk level
Local
Government
must look at ﬂood
risk and approval
ratio for every
proposald
Baseline NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO
1 NO NO NO NO YES NO NO NO
2 NO NO YES NO NO NO NO NO
3 YES YES YES YES NO NO NO NO
4 NO NO NO NO NO YES NO NO
5 NO NO NO NO NO YES YES YES
6 YES YES YES YES NO YES YES YES
7 YES YES NO YES NO YES YES YES
8 NO NO YES NO NO NO YES YES
a This is used to test decision making of the developer based on proﬁtability if they had to cover the insurance for 5 years.
b Thenumber of developments allowed reﬂects the annual Camden development trajectories. In this scenario, thenumber of propertieswhich can be built is reduced by50% annually as
a ﬁrst example.
c The development approval ratio is increased from 1 (i.e. proﬁts from selling landmust be ≥ to the additional level of ﬂood risk added to the local area by the development) to 1.25 (i.e.
the proﬁtmade from selling land for developmentwill need to be ≥25% higher than the additional level of ﬂood risk added to the local area for thedevelopment to be approved). This initial
assumption is based on the premise that demand for housing as well as potential economic beneﬁts can provide a case for developers to continue to build on high ﬂood risk land, and for
local authorities to approve such developments;
d In comparison to the baseline where 75% of proposals are randomly approved by the local government straightaway.
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under experiment 6. The average level of SW ﬂood risk to new build
properties is reduced by 27% from the baseline by year 30. This is similar
to experiment 7 but also includes the need for developers to build all
new properties with SUDS.
In the model the trend in development reﬂects the growth trajecto-
ries outlined for Camden, Under all the experiments the total number of
developments follow a very similar trajectory over the 30-year time pe-
riod (Fig. 7b), even under experiments 6 and 7 where 50% less proper-
ties can be built annually. This is because in the ABM the local
developer focuses the majority of new developments in speciﬁed Op-
portunity Areas (OAs) reﬂecting areas designated by the council for
large development, and with a maximum limit on total houses
(Camden Council, 2016). The OAs begin to be full by around year 22
and so the trajectory begins to slow and converges with that of experi-
ments 6 and 7 which increase at a steadier rate over time.
Fig. 7a highlights a clear divergence in trajectories for properties at
risk of SW ﬂooding. Certain options, such as demonstrated under exper-
iment 7, act as stronger barriers to the development of properties in
areas of high SW ﬂood risk. Interestingly, as the local developer aimsFig. 3. a) Average household SW ﬂood risk and b) average ﬂood insuranceto build in the most proﬁtable areas, which are often areas of high
ﬂood risk in the case of Camden, the requirement to build all properties
with SUDS (experiment 6) actually results in more properties being
built in areas of SW ﬂood risk overall (Fig. 7a). This reﬂects the assump-
tion that SUDS would reduce any ﬂood damage by 35% (Defra, 2011) in
the model. This lowering of ﬂood risk means that more properties are
deemed to have an acceptable level of SW ﬂood risk and subsequently
receive government approval, which otherwise would not be the case.
These ﬁndings highlight the complexities in identifying the right bal-
ance in ﬂood risk reduction actions by developers and local government
and shed light on the potential trade-offs which will need to be made
between managing ﬂood risk, developing in ﬂood plains and meeting
housing targets.
The importance of coordinating the developer and local government
risk reduction strategies is further highlighted by experiment 8. Al-
though the developer builds all new properties with SUDS and the
local government reduces the acceptable level of ﬂood risk and must
consider this alongside the development approval ratio for all proposals,
the level of ﬂood risk is marginally higher than seen under experiments
5 and 7. This is as under this experiment properties at the highest levelpremium of all houses in ﬂood risk estimated under experiments 1–3.
Fig. 4. The number of new build houses in the model simulation built with SUDS in place.
Fig. 6. Average household SW ﬂood risk of new builds built in areas of ﬂood risk. Baseline
climate scenario.
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considered proﬁtable. This is further highlighted in Fig. 7a,where exper-
iment 8 results in the largest number of houses being built in SW ﬂood
risk in the model by year 30.
Fig. 8 highlights the upper and lower bounds of themodel results, in
terms of the average ﬂood insurance premium across existing and new
build houses, and across a sub-set of the experiments. All the experi-
ments, except for experiment 1 (where there were no government re-
strictions placed on the developer), are beneﬁcial in terms of reducing
average household premiums from the baseline. Results under experi-
ments 3, 6 and 8 are most beneﬁcial compared to the baseline. This ap-
pears counter intuitive when, for example, results for experiments 6
and 8 are compared to Fig. 7a where they are shown to result in a larger
number of properties being built in areas of ﬂood risk. The reason for
this is that in these experiments all new properties are built with
SUDS in place, which allows more properties to be approved by the
local governmentwhilst also reducing the SW ﬂood risk and premiums.
The potential for counteractive effects when combining constraints andFig. 5. (a) The effect of differentﬂood protectionmeasures on average household SW ﬂood risk f
average ﬂood insurance premiums. Baseline Climate scenario.measures targeted to developers and the local government is a key ﬁnd-
ing of this research and an area that warrants further investigation.
Lastly, it is highlighted that the magnitude and trends in average
ﬂood premiums can differ when future climate change is considered
(Appendix B, Fig. B2). For the future climate scenarios experiment 1 re-
sults in premiums higher than the baseline experiment, whilst under all
other experiments beneﬁts in terms of reduced premiums are seen.
However, as SW ﬂood risk increases over time the options that are
most beneﬁcial change. As such, issues of continued development and
ﬂood risk management should also be viewed in a longer-term context
given the threat of climate change and negative consequences for ﬂood
frequency and intensity.
5. Discussion
Partnerships have been receiving signiﬁcant attention since the turn
of the century within the sustainable development, disaster risk man-
agement and climate change ﬁelds. MSPs in particular are seen as “theor existing and newbuild houses; and (b) the effects of theseﬂood protectionmeasures on
Fig. 7. Total number of (a) houses built at risk of SW ﬂooding; and (b) houses built.
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plex and multi-faceted problems (Pinkse and Kolk, 2012). Yet, despite
this positive rhetoric, little research has been done on how partnerships
can facilitate and incentivise disaster risk reduction (e.g. Sherlock et al.,
2004; Pinkse andKolk, 2012; Chen et al., 2013). One of the common crit-
icisms of partnerships is that they often involve the ‘usual suspects’ and
do not engage with all the relevant actors (Sherlock et al., 2004). In the
case of Flood Re, it is unlikely to encourage adaptation to rising ﬂood
risks from climate change if it is not part of a wider strategy that also
considers land use planning, investment in structural ﬂood defences,
policies to control ﬂoodplain development, building regulations and
water management (Horn and McShane, 2013). Flood Re itself ac-
knowledges that it does not have strong direct levers to inﬂuence
ﬂood resilient decisions due to its design (Flood Re, 2016).
Our analysis of the UK's ﬂood insurance partnership, using the case
study of the London Borough of Camden, suggests a range of options
for strengthening the current arrangement and role of the local devel-
oper and government in the face of rising SW ﬂood risk. For example,
the local developer is key as properties built after 2009 are excluded
from Flood Re, yet if and how new developments go ahead in ﬂood
risk areas will still have implications for insurers who are likely to stillFig. 8. Average ﬂood insurance premium of all houses in ﬂood risk.cover these high-risk properties, and for home-owners who may ulti-
mately face higher insurance premiums. The role of the local govern-
ment and developer is particularly important here as although they do
not have a formal relationshipwith FloodRe their actions can determine
future risk levels for both existing and new build properties. As shown
through the ABM, approval to build in areas of high ﬂood risk orwithout
any in-built resilience measures can affect the number of eligible prop-
erties potentially ceded to Flood Re and affect its longer-term
sustainability.
The beneﬁts of local government investment in SUDS (applied to
existing houses) and PLPMs are clearly shown in the ABM results.
Local government investment in these measures is beneﬁcial to the in-
surer as the risk portfolio is reduced and to households whose pre-
miums are reduced. The ABM also shows that for Camden a stricter
approval process for new development, with a greater weight given to
ﬂood risk, does have a clear impact on the overall ﬂood risk, but also
leads to trade-offs for the local government in terms of generating in-
come from new developments, meeting housing targets and reducing
ﬂood risks.
The ABMwas developed andparameterised for Camden, and as such
is reﬂective of the speciﬁc levels of SW ﬂood risk, local housing market,
demographicmake-up, and local government development trajectories.
For example, new developments are focused in deﬁned OAs, which due
to limited land availability in the Borough are often situated in areas of
SW ﬂood risk. While speciﬁc results are not directly transferable a ben-
eﬁt of the ABM framework is that it can be applied to other regions, and
an important area of further research would be to conduct a compara-
tive analysis with other London Boroughs to understand the inﬂuence
of such factors on the suitability of different hypothetical constraints
and policies.
A second beneﬁt of the ABM approach is its ability to investigate dif-
ferent combinations of restrictions placed on the developer and local
government, and the impacts and trade-offs that this can have on future
developments and insurance premiums. The ABM results suggest that
while a stricter local government stance on the approval of develop-
ments in ﬂood risk areas in Camden does reduce insurance premiums,
the strategies that result in the lowest premiums also lead to a larger
number of developments in areas of ﬂood risk.
This underlines the current lack of understanding with regards to
the interplay and dynamic feedbacks between physical and social pro-
cesses when investigating ﬂood risk (Di Baldassarre et al., 2015), and
highlights the potential broader role of the ABM framework in helping
to explore such dynamics and trade-offs. Indeed, beyond the Camden
case study there is evidence that such trade-offs are already occurring,
with local authorities encouraging developers to build in ﬂood plains
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can ﬁnance large ﬂood protection or resilience projects. Yet, such strat-
egies are not sustainable in the long-term and a better understanding of
these trade-offs is an area that warrants further investigation at a
broader scale.
Another important point that needs to be considered at a broader
scale, is the impact of climate change and other risk drivers on insurance
premiums. We ﬁnd that over time current strategies for maintaining
low insurance premiums and managing ﬂood risk may become less ef-
fective, unless adjusted to the new risk trends. This highlights the im-
portance of engaging with multiple actors to strengthen the
partnership, and allowing a ﬂexible framework that can be modiﬁed
over time as different risk thresholds are passed.
The study demonstrates the potential of using an ABM to inform and
support the development of enhanced ﬂood insurance partnerships to
incentivise ﬂood risk reduction and adaptation to climate change.
Filatova (2015) highlights the need tomove from conceptualmodelling
experiments to simulating real life situations using available data if an
ABM is to be applied for policy analysis and be seen as robust by relevant
stakeholders. In this study, the model has been parameterised based on
a large array of data sources, developed around GIS data, and repeated
simulations carried out to provide an assessment of uncertainty. How-
ever, a limitation of this is that the ABM inevitably becomes more com-
plex and potentially more chaotic. As with all models, the results must
be carefully interpreted given the number of underlying assumptions
necessary given this complexity. Model veriﬁcation has been used to
test principle components are accurately captured, and the model out-
puts remain robust given available evidence.
One beneﬁt of the ABM framework is the ﬂexibility that allows fu-
ture revisions to be quickly made. For example, if appropriate literature
becomes available then updates could bemade to model the beneﬁts of
PLPMs and SUDS in a more heterogeneous manner given different se-
verities of ﬂood depth. Secondly, if data was available then additional
user selections could be added, in the samemanner as used to represent
SUDS, to capture speciﬁc options included in the London Sustainable
Drainage Action plan such as the role of, and potential economic bene-
ﬁts of, detention basins or stormwater tanks (for example see De
Paola and Ranucci, 2012). Alternatively, if future updates are made to
the underlying Drain London SWF maps, e.g. hydraulic modelling sce-
narios included hypothetical or proposed implementation of structural
defences like detention basins, then the set of synthetic ﬂood events
used here could be extended and incorporated into the ABM to capture
and compare these additional scenarios. Lastly, while the ABM pre-
sented here is focused on a case study of Camden, the modelling ap-
proach is also transferable to other regions in the UK and
internationally given the availability of relevant data that would be re-
ﬂective of local levels of SW ﬂood risk, legislation and approaches to
ﬂood risk management, and demographic make-up etc.
Yet, for FloodRe the validation ofmodel outputswill only bepossible
once theﬁrst few years of claims and premiumdata are available, and as
more information on behaviour of the actors emerge. In addition, our
model is designed around those actors deemed most relevant in this
context, but we acknowledge that other key actors, such as water com-
panies and mortgage providers, may have a critical role to play in pro-
viding a more holistic approach to ﬂood risk management
(Kunreuther andMichel-Kerjan, 2009; Sargent et al., 2009). How to bet-
ter integrate these actors in ﬂood risk management decision-making to
better incentivise ﬂood risk reduction is a critical issue for further
research.
6. Conclusion
Insurance is an important tool for addressingﬂood risk. Yet, develop-
ing the right ﬂood insurance arrangements to incentivise ﬂood risk re-
duction and adaptation to climate change remains an international
challenge (Surminski, 2014; Surminski et al., 2015; EuropeanCommission, 2013). This paper provides insights on the importance of
MSPs in order to utilise insurance for ﬂood risk reduction, suggesting
ways in which different policy options and actions from local govern-
ment and property developers could reduce SW ﬂood risk, help main-
tain affordable insurance premiums and strengthen the current ﬂood
insurance partnership. Yet, our ﬁndings also show the many trade-offs
that actors may face. Finding the optimal strategy for reducing SW
ﬂood risk; maintaining low insurance premiums; constraining develop-
ment in ﬂood plains; and meeting housing targets will be challenging
under current conditions, let alone in the face of rising risks.
For partnerships this is an important aspect as overall the partners
tend to agree on a common aim, but their objectives and their under-
standing of roles and responsibilities are likely to differ. For Flood Re
the overarching aim is the availability and affordability of ﬂood insur-
ance, but views differ on who to pay, what to cover and how to design
the scheme. Interestingly Flood Re itself has now acknowledged that
risk reduction efforts are essential for the future affordability of ﬂood in-
surance, and have pledged to collaborate closer with other stakeholders
on this (Surminski, 2016).
Regarding the role of government, it is important to highlight that
different governance layers are relevant for theﬂood insurance partner-
ship. Public policy is shaping the way insurance is designed and pro-
vided: directly through regulation such as mandating cover or
instigating the development of new schemes; and indirectly by provid-
ing the enabling infrastructure and environment, for example through a
broad risk reduction framework, including building codes, planning reg-
ulations and better ﬂood risk data provisions. Therefore, a stronger pol-
icy approach to ﬂood risk management would make the insurance
partnership more viable. For this, collaboration between the national
and local authorities, planners, and developers is crucial.
Engagement with those other actors could take many different
forms. This is especially apparent in the case of property development.
Flood Re explicitly excludes newbuild to avoidmoral hazard fromprop-
erty developers. However, this position could in future come under
pressure. If new property developments in high risk areas were to con-
tinue, as current trends suggest (Committee on Climate Change, 2015),
this could create political pressure on Flood Re to expand its remit and
to offer cover to those newbuild properties. In the context of our assess-
ment, this would not strengthen the partnership, but remove the only
risk reduction incentive that Flood Re has. Instead, engaging with prop-
erty developers could be more effective beyond the core risk transfer.
The insurance industry itself, as the world's largest institutional inves-
tor, clearly has a role to play. Ironically, investment decisions by insurers
do not usually consider the climate risk knowledge gained on the un-
derwriting side. Far too often property and infrastructure investment
decisions go ahead without any reﬂection on climate risks (Surminski
et al., 2016). A closer reﬂection on ﬂood resilience whenmaking invest-
ment decisions could therefore have positive implication for the ﬂood
insurance provision.
In a similar way, it would be important to investigate the options for
collaboration between insurance and local government. One recent ex-
ample that may lead to more resilience is the Resilience Zone concept
(e.g. see Ceres, 2013). Resilience zones are urban areas, speciﬁcally vul-
nerable to climate change risks, which are earmarked for regeneration
via comprehensive riskmanagement– a process that brings together in-
surers, developers and local governments.While this is at an explorative
phase, our ABM could be applied and provide useful insights into how
different actors and policy options may inﬂuence risk levels.
Likewise, while the ABMpresented here is focused on a case study of
Camden, the modelling approach and ﬁndings are highly relevant for
wider discussions on the potential of insurance schemes to incentivise
ﬂood risk management and climate adaptation in the UK and interna-
tionally. There is clear momentum at the international level to use in-
surance to incentivise risk prevention and adaptation (Surminski et al.,
2016). This can include investment and support for more structural
measures such as those classiﬁed as part of SUDS. The engagement of
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bilities will determine if and how those new schemes can support cli-
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Appendix A. Overview of the Agent Based Model and key
assumptions
The ABM has been parameterised based on a large array of data
sources and developed around GIS data. A copy of the model and full
documentation, including an ODD protocol, description of model pa-
rameters, values and sources, model veriﬁcation and sensitivity analysis
are available online at https://www.openabm.org/model/4647/version/
3/view.
A key input to the ABM is a probabilistic SW ﬂood event set (Jenkins
et al., 2017b). This provides time series data of spatial SW ﬂood events
for a baseline period (1961–1990), the 2030s (2020–2040), and 2050s
(2040–2060) under high (H) emission scenarios (comparable to Repre-
sentative Concentration Pathways 4.5 and 8.5 respectively). The SW
ﬂood event set was developed using Drain London (Greater London Au-
thority, 2017) SW ﬂood depth maps for 1/30, 1/100, and 1/200 year re-
turn periods. The SW ﬂood depth maps were based on modelling a
virtual representation of the ground topography, including underlying
sewer networks, road gullies, large culverts and road underpasses and
then applying water to the surface using a computational algorithm to
determine the direction, depth and velocity of the resulting ﬂows. This
included ﬂooding from run-off generation, sewers, drains, groundwater,
small watercourses, and ditches which occurs as a result of heavy rain-
fall. The modelling accounted for rainfall onto roofs, which is then dis-
tributed to represent the routing of rainfall into the network through
gutters and drainpipes (e.g. see details in The Royal Borough of
Kensington and Chelsea SW Plan (2014)).
To identify the occurrence and spatial extent of individual ﬂood
events the corresponding return level of extreme precipitation events
of 1/30, 1/100, and 1/200 year return periods were estimated for the
baseline period (1961–1990) using an hourly Weather Generator
(WG), conditioned upon the UK's probabilistic climate projections
(UKCP09). The rainfall return levels are then used as thresholds to re-
scale the SW ﬂood depth maps for each simulated ﬂood event to gener-
ate corresponding spatially heterogeneous ﬂood outlines (Jenkins et al.,
2017b). By overlaying the spatial ﬂood maps onto residential building
data properties at risk of SW ﬂooding, and the ﬂood depth, were identi-
ﬁed. Economic damages to residential buildings were estimated using
established ﬂood depth-damage functions (Penning-Rowsell et al.,
2010).
Based on the estimated economic damage to houses for given ﬂood
return periods, a probability-damage curve is estimated annually for
every house in the model, and SW ﬂood risk calculated as the area
under the curve. Based on the formula in Bevan and Hall, 2014, p.17)in any given year (t), the risk (ri t), is given by:
ri;t ¼
Z ∞
0
D xtð Þ f xtð Þdxt ð1Þ
where, D(xt) is a damage functionwith x changing overtime, and f(xt) is
the ﬂood probability distribution.
Household ﬂood risk is recalculated every year to reﬂect the dy-
namic changes in themodel due to investment in ﬂood protectionmea-
sures which, if installed, are assumed to reduce the estimated economic
damage (D) to houses by between 35 and 75% (outlined below). The
household damage from ﬂoods of given return periods do not change
under the future climate scenarios, but the probability of such events
occurring do. To illustrate this the probability damage-curves are ad-
justed accordingly for each climate scenario to reﬂect the change in
probability of events.
In this analysis we only model the technical side of ﬂood insurance
and not the commercial side (i.e. competition between insurers,
whichmight modify the offered premium). As we focus on SW ﬂooding
we limit the insurer's attention to the SW ﬂood history of a house and
the estimated SW ﬂood risk. In the ABM we assume that an insurer
has detailed information that provides an estimate of SW ﬂood risk
(Eq. (1)). Based on that risk estimate and a ﬂat administration cost the
insurance premium and excess (the ﬁxed value of each claim the
homeowner has to pay) is calculated for each house. The insurer ﬁrst
sets the ﬂood insurance excess for all houses. The assumption is made
that the ﬂood insurance excess amount is non-negotiable and is initially
equal to £200 per claim (Flood Re, 2016) on an annual policy. Houses hit
during a SW ﬂood event will see their insurance excesses increase by 1/
3rd, up to a maximum of £2500 (House of Commons Environment,
2013).
The SW ﬂood risk estimates of houses are summed across all houses
in ﬂood risk in the model, representing the insurers expected annual
loss. The insurer deducts from this the total value of excesses paid and
the total base ﬂood insurance premium paid by all households in the
model, assumed to be £50 per house per year. This provides an estimate
of the remaining annual loss that has to be covered. The remaining loss
is spread across the households at risk of SW ﬂooding, by increasing
their household ﬂood insurance premium proportionally to the ﬂood
risk they are in. In this way people owning a house in SW ﬂood risk
will receive a higher ﬂood insurance premium.
When switched on in the ABM the insurer has the option to re-
insure eligible properties (those built prior to 2009) into Flood Re,
with household ﬂood insurance premiums ﬁxed dependent on the
property value (approximated according to the local property council
tax rate ranging from £210 to £1200 in the study area) The insurer
will have to pay to re-insure a household into Flood Rewith a ﬁxed pre-
mium per policy to the insurer also dependent on the property value. In
this way the total compensation the insurer pays following a ﬂood will
be lower when the Flood Re option is selected, as they are no longer re-
quired to compensate the highest risk houses.
In themodel the local government agent aims to reduceﬂood risk by
investing in SW ﬂood reduction projects in the form of SUDS, and the
provision of grants for PLPMs, reﬂecting current legislation and recom-
mendations (Pitt, 2008; DCLG, 2014). It is assumed that PLPMs and
SUDS will reduce the estimated economic ﬂood damage (D) of
protected houses by 75% (Thurston et al., 2008) and 35% (Defra, 2011)
respectively. The amount the local government can spend on SUDS
and grants for PLPMs every year is equal to the annual subsidy they re-
ceive from the national government and a small percentage of their in-
come from selling land to the property developer and collecting
property taxes from home owners. Initially it is assumed that up to
80% of this budget can be spent annually on SUDS and 20% for PLPM
grants.
In the ABM the local government will proactively search for SUDS
projects to invest in every year. Every project consists of a minimum
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selected based on the ﬂood risk of houses and the beneﬁt-cost ratio that
the local government would achieve for each project. From the identi-
ﬁed projects the local government will try to build as many as it can
with the budget it has, starting with the projects with the highest
beneﬁt-cost ratio. The second task of the local government is the evalu-
ation of development proposals. The developer will establish the num-
ber of houses it wishes to build based on the current unmet demand
for housing in the model. The developer selects an area to build based
on available land with the highest economic value of surrounding
houses and proﬁtability. Based on the development plans of Camden
speciﬁc Opportunity Areas (OAs) are outlined where the developer
can build as many houses as optimal per year, with a maximum limit
on total houses (Camden Council, 2016). Outside of the development
areas the developer is limited by a maximum number of houses it can
build per year (150–200) reﬂecting the planned housing trajectory of
Camden (Camden Council, 2013). It is initially assumed that 50% of all
new properties are built with SUDS in place (Defra, 2011).
In the initial model set up a development proposal will be approved
by the local government if, i) it is equivalent or greater than the local
governments approval ratio. This is set to 1 as default, meaning that aFig. B1. The effect of experiments 1–3 on the average household ﬂood risk estimated under (a
mated under (b) 2030H and (d) 2050H climate scenarios.
Appendix B. Selected results for the 2030H and 2050H climate scenariosdevelopment can be approved as long as the proﬁt from selling land is
equivalent or greater than the additional level of ﬂood risk added to
the local area. This assumption is based on the premise that demand
for housing as well as economic beneﬁts both could provide a case for
developers to continue to build on high ﬂood risk land, and for local au-
thorities to approve such developments.
Secondly, a development proposalwill be approved by the local gov-
ernment if ii), it is below the governments maximum acceptable ﬂood
risk level. However, although regulation on approving development
proposals states that local governments should consider ﬂood risk, ﬁg-
ures indicate that in 75% of cases ﬂood risk is not looked at (Wynn,
2005). As such in 25% of cases the development proposal will be ap-
proved if the proposed ﬂood risk of the development is lower than the
government's acceptable maximum ﬂood risk and it is equivalent or
greater than the local government's approval ratio. If this is not the
case the development proposalmay still be approved based on the prof-
itability to the local government. This reasoning reﬂects the current
pressure local governments are put under by central government
to develop more houses within their borough, and highlights trade-
offs which must be made when addressing ﬂood risk and housing
shortages.) 2030H and (c) 2050H climate scenarios, and the average ﬂood insurance premium esti-
Fig. B2. Average ﬂood insurance premiums of houses in ﬂood risk under (a) 2030H and (b) 2050H climate scenarios.
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